Introduction
While delivering her presentation (International Responses, Accountability Gaps, and Structural Dynamics shaping the World after Gaza), Dr. Shahd Hammouri began with an anecdote about her visit and interaction with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. Her experience at this moment was quite striking. As she attempts to convey the full picture of the situation and the lived experiences of civilians in Gaza, subjected to Israel’s widespread and indiscriminate bombardment followed by mass atrocious crimes, she remarked a sudden and inexplicable shift in tone from the Commissioner. The discussion, as she explained, diverted from the core issue of the human rights violations happening in Gaza, to quite unconnected issues. This, according to her, represented something bigger than just the Commissioner’s own indifference or reluctance; it is a wider pattern of global and institutional detachment from the real situation in Gaza.
For me as a participant, this brief but intense story became a defining highlight during the Winter School held from 4 to 12 February 2026 organised by the Law and Development Research Group, University of Antwerp, in collaboration with the Muwatin Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, Birzeit University, on: The International Order After Gaza: Failure, Emancipatory Possibilities, Decolonial futures. International law was founded, and it is based on the overarching goal of preventing and punishing acts constituting breaches of international law rules wherever they occur. This basic understanding of international law rules has shaped contemporary international legal framework and significantly contributed to preserving relative ‘peace’ in the world since the end of World War II.
Yet Israel’s latest war on Gaza, and allegations of its war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide[1], exposes several underlying structural (institutional) shortcomings in the current framework. For many experts, advocates and observers, the stark contrast between what international law promises versus what it actually delivers has never been so apparent.
In light of the foregoing, this blog contribution aims to discuss and reflect on three key questions that have increasingly become unavoidable in the context of the war and atrocities in Gaza. It first of all asks, how does international response to atrocities in Gaza challenges but also, put to test the current framework of international law, and instruments of its enforcement? Secondly, it interrogates to what extent does it expose structural limitations, biases, inconsistencies within the global legal order, with respect to anti-colonial and national liberation movements? And finally, how should global legal framework evolve to effectively ensure accountability, and prevent atrocious crimes, especially in settler colonial contexts like Palestine?
To answer the foregoing questions, this blog relies on lectures, presentations, experts discussions, contributions from participants (including participant’s presentations, questions and answers), field visits throughout the Winter School, and general literature related to the topic.
International law promises and failures
To begin with, one of the fundamental questions that was at the center of this year’s Winter School discussion (as it should be) was: for whom international law was made and to whom does it apply? The opening session on Self-determination, Statehood, and International Law began by discussing the origin of contemporary international law framework, as a post-World War II achievement, at the same time noting that most of the input that went into this system as it exists today, mainly came from imperial colonial powers. Modern international law emerged at a time when more than half of people and nations around the world were either still under colonial occupations or a form of foreign dominance. This is important because international law in its current form still appears less sophisticated to deal with problems read as ‘anti-colonial or anti-imperial.’ Palestine is a unique example. The question of Palestinian statehood has rarely been addressed by the UN Security Council in a manner capable of bringing about lasting solutions or advancing the recognition of Palestine and the rights of its people. This is not surprising because the UNSC, the most powerful decision-making organ within the UN system, is still dominated by former colonial powers notably, Britain, France and the US, which along with Russia and China, enjoy permanent membership and veto rights at the Council.
Furthermore, international response to the genocide in Gaza best illustrate the fragmentation within the post-world war legal order. As the main subjects of international law, states have equal obligation to take collective or individual measures necessary to prevent and punish genocide. Though this may sound concrete, practically the reality is different. South Africa’s genocide case filed before the International Court of Justice, alleging a violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention by Israel, as discussed in one of the sessions, first, highlights the scale of the atrocities committed in Palestine and against Palestinians in Gaza.[2] This blog does not claim that South Africa case before the court is already a formal ruling that genocide has occurred. It remains the task of the ICJ and judges to establish that there is a dolus specialis (special intent) to commit genocide by Israel.
Having said that, the ICJ would not have taken up the case if they were no compelling evidence of genocide. As of September 2025, the report of an independent inquiry commission under the UN Human Rights Council estimates the dead toll in Gaza at around 60,199 civilians including over 18000 children and concludes that Israel has committed a genocide against in Gaza.[3] South Africa relied on these evidence to support its claim of genocide and request the court to adopt urgent measures against Israel. The ICJ has proceeded to indicate provisional measures for Israel to act upon to prevent ‘irreparable harm,’ highlighting the compelling nature of the prima facie evidence the Court considers in its assessment.
Also, South Africa’s argument with respect to Israel’s genocidal intent is deduced from the use of dehumanizing language against Palestinians by Israeli government officials.[4]
Moreover, the number of third state intervention: eighteen countries, is equally a strong indication, and at the same time, a demonstration of the respective countries’ commitment towards their moral and legal responsibilities under the genocide Convention.
While it is relevant to point out that international mechanisms like the ICJ exist as a key institution to seek accountability, the actual problem is at the level of international law enforcement. As one participant noted, the tools available, including provisional measures, are good but not strong enough if they are not accompanied by a broader global consensus. In the context of Gaza, some states have preferred a cautious approach despite their erga omnes obligation: to prevent and punish genocide. Political and other interests have taken precedence over international law obligations, leading to further fragmentation of international law enforcement. Nicaragua counter Germany’s argument of ‘raison d’état’ by stating that Germany cannot invoke this to override its peremptory obligations, to prevent and punish genocide.[5] However, doing so could amount to being complicit in Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Similarly, Israel’s investment in arms manufacturing in the Netherlands has increased since the start of its war in Gaza, according to independent NGO report. Whereas trade in spare parts used in military equipment to carry out air campaigns in highly dense civilian areas in Gaza surged during the war. These are clearly violations of international humanitarian law rules, and state peremptory obligations.
Structural limitations, biases within international legal order, in the face of anti-colonial and national liberation movements
Structural challenges, including institutional limitations and deep biases underpinning the current international legal order, and how the war in Gaza revealed these issues were also discussed. For example, the right to self-determination as recognized under international law which every group of people is entitled to pursue and enjoy, is not equally applicable as it should. Palestine is a textbook example of settler colonialism. In this form of settler-colonialism that is very well known to many people around the world, international law should serve as a tool to confront them and when it fails, it then becomes bias, and a tool of domination.
Also, some speakers equally highlighted structural biases in international law, particularly when discussing institutional responsibilities. It became apparent to some universities around the world that continued cooperation with Israeli universities, amidst its ongoing crimes and human rights abuses in Gaza, could be seen as being complicit in those crimes, participating in breach of human rights law, as well as jus cogens principle. This, however, remains a highly contested issue. Some universities or their affiliated bodies still maintain ties with Israeli universities – despite direct links to state institutions accused of genocide.
In Belgium, for instance, this measure has not been applied uniformly by all universities. Despite the ongoing genocide in Gaza, some institutions have remained indifferent. This position could perhaps be explained by several factors such as differences in the understanding and interpretation of universities’ responsibilities vis-à-vis international law principles variations in institutional ethical standards, or divergent understanding of universities’ human rights obligations. Irrespective of the reason, there is clearly an emerging inconsistency in how these institutions have reacted in similar instances of grave human rights abuses elsewhere.
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in breach of international law rules, there was no question whether maintaining cooperation with Russian universities infringed on universities ethical standards. Universities and other institutions of higher learning, especially European ones, proactively disengaged from collaborative partnerships with Russian institutions for fear of being complicit in Russia’s crimes in Ukraine. This decision was overwhelmingly supported at institutional levels, European Union. However, amid the plausible genocide in Gaza by Israel, the failure by certain universities to invoke and apply the same standards of ethical rules to those in the Russia-Ukraine situation is very striking. This obviously raises some concerns, regarding double standards in the application of universities’ ethical principles, and broader question whether those ethical rules could simply be bent depending on the identity of the state in question.
Furthermore, the inconsistency in how some universities apply their ethical rules in the face of serious human rights violations –like in the case of Palestine – raises a basic yet important question: should universities that teach courses on international law and human rights law not be leading by example, that is implementing rules of international law and human rights in everyday institutional practices?
Necessity for evolution in global legal framework to guarantee enforcement, accountability for perpetrators and prevent atrocious crimes
After diagnosing the shortcomings of the global legal framework in preventing crimes in Gaza, a very important question was raised and equally discussed: how to breach accountability gaps and prevent impunity?
To prevent further atrocities and ensure accountability for severe crimes, significant emphasis was placed on prioritising a decentralised approach to the enforcement of international criminal justice. The use of domestic criminal legal framework to prosecute international crimes was mentioned. This approach has been used, and is believed to be effective in several instances. A case in point is the arrest and prosecution of Mr. Alaa M., a Syrian doctor by the Staatsschutzsenat of the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt for crimes against humanity and war crimes of killing, and torture he committed in the context of the Syrian war between 2011 and 2012. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment.[6] Meanwhile, similar trials have also been conducted in Switzerland, Belgium, and France.[7]
In the case of Palestine, Brazil, for example, has confirmed that it will arrest individuals suspected of committing crimes in Gaza.[8] In July 2025, Belgium arrested and interrogated, albeit briefly, two Israeli soldiers suspected of war crimes in Gaza.[9] Although their arrest did not trigger a formal investigation or prosecution, most likely because of imminent political or diplomatic backlash, this is important for two reasons. First, it sets precedence for other states with robust criminal justice systems to prosecute potential suspects actively present on their territory accused of crimes in Gaza. Secondly, international accountability mechanisms like the ICC operate on a very high procedural threshold, making it very challenging to prosecute rank and file soldiers even if they are suspected of committing serious crimes. Since the ICC option is ‘limited’ particularly in Gaza, victims can only hope that States that remain committed to international justice prioritize accountability over geopolitics and other personal interests.
Conclusion
This article highlighted and discussed some key topics of this year’s Winter School which focused on The International Order After Gaza: Failure, Emancipatory Possibilities, Decolonial Futures. The blog contribution identified and looked at some of the gaps in the present global legal framework with a particular focus on how international law operates differently in practice. It also discussed some underlying baises and showed how these unaddressed issues are perceived as failures and how it contributes to weakening the current order. Recognizing these challenges is the first most important step towards a more responsive framework that can address accountability gaps and prevent atrocious crimes.
[1] Francesca Albanese, ‘Situation of Human Rights on Palestinian Territory Occupied since 1967: Gaza Genocide: A Collective Crime’ (20 October 2025) UN Doc A/80/492 <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/special-rapporteur-report-gaza-genocide-a-collective-crime-20oct25/> Accessed 20 February 2026
[2] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Order) [2024] ICJ Rep.
[3] Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, ‘Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ UN Doc A/HRC/60/CRP.3 (16 September 2025) [20]. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/israel-has-committed-genocide-gaza-strip-un-commission-finds>.
[4] South Africa v Israel (Order 24 May 2024) [46].
[5] Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of Occupied Palestinian Territories (Nicaragua v. Germany) Written Statement of the Republic of Nicaragua on the Preliminary Objections Raised by the Federal Republic of Germany (ICJ, 23 February 2026) [21].
[6] ‘Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main, ‘Alaa M. Sentenced to Lifelong Imprisonment’ (Press Release No 35/2025, 16 June 2025) <https://ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/presse/alaa-m-was-sentenced-to-lifelong-imprisonment> accessed 4 July 2026.
[7] See, Anwar R. (Higher Regional Court of Koblenz, judgement of 13 January 2022) Case No 1StE 9/19<https://olgko.justiz.rlp.de/presse-aktuelles/detail/lebenslange-haft-ua-wegen-verbrechens-gegen-die-menschlichkeit-und-wegen-mordes-urteil-gegen-einen-mutmasslichen-mitarbeiter-des-syrischen-geheimdienstes> accessed July 4, 2026; Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland v Alieu Kosiah (Federal Criminal Court, Higher Appeal Chamber, CA.2022.8, 30 May, 2023) <https://www.bstger.ch/en/media/comunicati-stampa/2023/2023-06-01/1341.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed July 4, 2026; Ministère Public v Kunti Kamara (Cour d’assises d’appel de Paris, Judgement, 27 March 2024);Public Prosecutor v Manuel Benedicto Lucas García and Others (Brussels Court of Assize, proceedings concerning the killing of Belgian Missionaries during the Guatemala armed conflict, indictment confirmed 14 Jue 2022).
[8] Gizem Nisa Cebi, ‘“Historic Moment”: Brazil Court Orders Investigation of IsraeliWar Crime Suspects’ (Anadolu Agency, 4 January 2025) https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/historic-moment-brazilian-court-orders-investigation-of-israeli-war-crimes-suspect/3441523> accessed 21 February 2026.
[9] Centro di Ateneo per i Diritti Umani ‘Belgian Authorities Arrest and Interrogate Israeli War Crimes Suspects Following Complaint by Hind Rajab Foundation and GLAN’ (9 August 2025) <https://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/en/news/belgian-authorities-arrest-and-interrogate-israeli-war-crimes-suspects-following-complaint-by-hind-rajab-foundation-and-glan> accessed 21 February 2026.